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Rosa Luxemburg's critique of Marx's Schemes of Reproduction is the only genuinely 
immanent critique of Marxian dynamics. But it needs to be brought up to date. To this end, 
in this paper it is placed in the context of more modern discussions of dual instability, in 
order to gain a better understanding of the role of price - as against quantity - adjustment in 
tackling instability. This allows us to discuss the path of prices as well as of quantities 
which have been the sole subject of controversy hitherto. Our approach also allows us to 
tackle the money circuit of capital parallel to the value circuit as outlined in the first part of 
Capital Vol 2.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Rosa Luxemburg’s immanent critique of Karl Marx’s accumulation schemes 
is well known. In her The Accumulation of Capital (1951), she not only gave an 
account of the rather spirited, but confused debate which broke out among the 
European Marxists on the publication of Volume 2 of Capital - especially the last 
chapter on the Scheme of Expanded Reproduction, - but she offered her own 
cogent critique and proposed a solution (Luxemburg, 1951; see also Desai, 1979, 
chapter 15). Marx’s Scheme appeared to offer a model of capitalist accumulation, 
which guaranteed perpetual growth at a steady rate for both sectors 
(Departments), and indeed has been characterised as the fastest converging two 
sector balanced growth model by Morishima (1973, chapter 10). Marx’s model 
seemed to go against the vision of a permanently cyclical course for capitalist 
accumulation outlined in Capital, Volume 1, Part VII. There were other 
inconsistencies between the two volumes’ portrayal of capitalist accumulation. In 
the Scheme for Expanded Reproduction (SER hereafter): (i) there is no technical 
progress and hence the value per unit of physical output in both Departments and 
the organic composition of capital are constants; (ii) the profit rate is computed in 
value terms rather than in money terms and differs between the two sectors; and 
(iii) the profit rate in each sector is constant and does not decline. Also in terms of 
Volume 2 itself, while Part I laid out the three circuits of capital in terms of value, 
money, and physical quantities, the SER is only in value terms. Prices or money 
play no role in the SER. 
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The SER generated a long debate. Was it a scheme for abstract study of how 
gross and net output are reconciled at the aggregate level, hence a pioneering 
exercise in national income accounting, or was it a realistic picture of how it was 
possible for a capitalist economy to grow? Was it a scheme for planning as it later 
proved useful in Fel’dman’s model for the Soviet Economy’s First Five Year Plan 
or did it lay down impossibility conditions for a capitalist economy ever to 
achieve balanced growth if it relied on uncoordinated accumulation plans, as 
against the accommodative behaviour postulated in the SER?1 
Rosa Luxemburg criticised Marx’s model as inconsistent within its own 
logic, since the realisation problem is not squarely faced but solved, as it were, by 
a sleight of hand. The limits to the supply of labour power are assumed away. 
Since each Department does not have ready demand for its output before it could 
plan accumulation, where does the money come from - she cogently asked - for 
each Department to place the order for extra machines which dissolves the 
problem? 
Where does the money come from? This question is loaded with dynamite. 
Marx had not tackled the circuit of money capital in the SER. Thus, the exchange 
of goods between the two Departments seemed to occur outside the exchange 
nexus, in a gigantic book keeping exercise for all capitalists together. If the 
question of money is posed, then each Department has to sell its output and realise 
the value and surplus value before making accumulation plans. Absent the issue 
of money, and the virtual market economy of SER can be swallowed. 
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In this paper, we want to pose the question of the money circuit and of prices 
explicitly. This is done not just for exegetical reasons but because the stability of 
the growth path in terms of value can be misleading, since it can very well be that 
in the realm of prices instability may reign. This is not just idle speculation. There 
is a well established literature on dual instability in Leontieff systems (see, e.g., 
Sargan, 1958; Jorgenson, 1960A, 1960B). This literature has a basic theorem, 
which states that: if the quantity system is stable, then the price system will be 
unstable, and vice versa. The reason for this is mathematically trivial; the roots of 
one system are the reciprocal of the roots of the other system. Extending this 
conjecture to the SER (which is an early example of the Leontieff input-output 
system) is at the heart of our inquiry. 
In what follows, the next section will lay out the general outlines of the SER 
as first proposed by Marx. Marx’s peculiar investment rule for the two sectors is 
then explained since it is the root cause for the super stable behaviour of the 
model. Most authors, including Luxemburg, did not question this rule. But it is at 
the heart of the problem: no capitalist economy can have a cooperative rule 
whereby one sector’s capitalists are willing to mop up the unsold output of 
another sector. But once Marx’s rule is dropped, there are many possibilities open 
as to how accumulation behaviour will be determined. In his treatment of SER, 
Morishima (1973) puts forward one such rule and analyses the roots of the 
resulting system. As a first option, we lay out the price system of Marx’s SER and 
then Morishima’s (1973) modification. This reveals the underlying instability of 
the Marxian model. This then shows the scope for future developments of the 
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Marxian model in a full three circuits of capital logic, where stability and 
instability are dialectically and mathematically intertwined. 
2. THE MODEL 
Marx’s SER has a familiar structure. Its elements are as follows: 
(a) There are two Departments wherein Department I makes machines which 
are consumed during the production process as constant capital, while Department 
II produces wage goods which are consumed by workers as well as capitalists; 
(b) The rate of exploitation is identical across the two Departments and 
constant over time as is the organic composition of capital in each Department; 
(c) Department I produces more units (measured in labour values) than is 
required for the replacement of consumed constant capital and by corollary 
Department II produces less than the sum of variable capital and surplus value; 
(d) The imbalance is resolved (i) by Department I accumulating ½ of its own 
surplus value and putting it in production at the same rate organic composition of 
capital as initially used; and (ii) by Department II buying up all the output of 
Department I surplus to the requirement of Department I and again keeping the 
same organic composition of capital as it started with. 
As is well known, the result of this process is that after the first year where 
the two Departments grow unevenly, every subsequent period they grow at 
constant rates. Accumulation in both Departments is at a constant rate. 
This is a powerful result and in the general context of Marx’s critique of 
political economy, it is surprising. Its interpretation remains contested and indeed 
became the subject of a long and intense controversy in the 25 years following the 
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publication of Volume 2 in 1884. Today, we understand the structure of Marx’s 
SER much better, but Rosa Luxemburg mounted an immanent critique of Marx’s 
scheme in as much as it rules out any realisation problem or any problem of 
shortage of labour power. She put the model in the larger context of a world with 
rich and poor countries wherein the rich countries solved their realisation problem 
by selling to the poor countries and buying cheap food stuffs from them to keep 
the value of the wage low.  
For our purposes the crucial insight that Luxemburg offers is to ask how 
Department I finds money to accumulate when it cannot sell its output and realise 
costs, much less profits. Where does the money come from? This points to a need 
to place the SER in the three circuits of capital framework where in addition to the 
C-C’ (value capital) circuit we have the M-M’ (money capital) and the Q-Q 
(physical capital) circuits.2 This means prices have to be solved for explicitly; the 
money sums advanced and realised have to be calculated. Since productivity is 
constant by assumption in the SER, the C-C’ and Q-Q circuits are exact images of 
each other. Thus out of the three circuits at least two need to be developed . The 
missing circuit is the money capital circuit. 
In order to describe the production structure of the SER, let A be the 2 × 2 
matrix of input coefficients, where aij is the quantity of good i used in the 
production of good j; let Ai. and A.j denote the i-th row and j-th column of A, 
respectively. Sector 1 produces capital goods, whereas sector 2 produces wage 
goods. Let Y be the 2 × 1 vector of activity levels; let e denote the uniform rate of 
exploitation. The familiar SER tables can be written as 
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Y1 = a11 Y1 + a21 (1 + e) Y1,    (1a) 
Y2 = a12 Y2 + a22 (1 + e) Y2.    (1b) 
The first equation is about the output of Department I which uses a11 of its 
own output and a21 of Department II’s output as inputs. The same logic applies to 
(1b) which gives us the output of Department II. In addition we begin with a 
disequilibrium condition that  
Y1 > a11 Y1 + a12 Y2,     (2a) 
Y2 < a21(1 + e)Y1 + a22 (1 + e)Y2.   (2b) 
Marx’s resolution of the disequilibrium is that Department I invests half (or 
generally a portion β) of its surplus value which equals e a21Y1. A portion of it 
goes to Department I itself as extra demand. This is given by the organic 
composition of capital which is ki = a1i/(a1i + a2i), i = 1, 2. Once this demand for 
its own product has been decided then Department II steps in to buy the rest of the 
available surplus output of Department I. So given (2a), at all t we have  
Y1t – (a11Y1t + a12Y2t) – (β e a21Y1t)k1 = θt (e a22Y2t)k2.  (3) 
In (3), θt is whatever number will equate the two sides at t. The result of 
steady growth follows from the next period onwards.  
Since this is an arbitrary behavioural rule, it is better to formulate the SER 
more generally. Morishima (1973) has done this. It is useful for our purposes to 
take his approach. He postulates a constant propensity to accumulate by all 
capitalists and the possibility for all capitalists to invest in either sector – given 
profit rate equalisation, – but retains the assumption of a constant organic 
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composition of capital. This allows him to set up the demand and supply 
equations for the two Departments in the form of a pair of difference equations. 
Thus, he has  
Y1t = a11Y1t + a12Y2t + a11 ∆Y1t + a12 ∆Y2t,   (4a) 
Y2t = a21 Y1t + a22 Y2t +a21 ∆Y1t + a22 ∆Y2t + b(s1Y1t + s2 Y2t),  (4b) 
where si = a2i e is the rate of surplus value in Department i, i = I, II, and b is the 
capitalist’s propensity to consume, which is one minus the propensity to 
accumulate, and is assumed to be equal for all capitalists. This pair of difference 
equations can be written in matrix form as: 
Y = AY + A ∆Y + BY,     (4) 
where B is a matrix with zeros in the upper row and [bs1, bs2] in the lower row. 
The latter expression can be rearranged as  
[I – A – B] Y = A ∆Y.     (5) 
Since ∆ denotes a forward difference, we can write down the basic 
difference equation of the SER as in Morishima (1973, p.123). 
[I – B]-1A Yt+1 = R Yt+1 = Yt,    (6) 
where R1i = a1i and R2i = (b si a1i + a2i)/(1 - ba22), i = 1, 2. Hence, all the Rij’s are 
positive. Solving the characteristic equation of the 2 x 2 matrix R, we can examine 
the roots, then the dynamic path of output will be determined by the reciprocal of 
the two roots of R. Of the two roots, µ1 is positive, smaller than one, but greater 
than µ2 - which is positive if and only if a12/a22 < a11/a21, that is if and only if 
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Department II is less capital intensive than Department I, as in Marx’s SER.3 
Morishima shows that unless the economy starts out with just the right 
proportions, it will have unstable balanced growth: “an economy starting from an 
initial point away from the balanced growth path will diverge from it as time goes 
on” (Morishima, 1973, p.125). This result is dramatically different from the fast 
convergence to balanced growth of the original Marxian SER. 
3. DUAL INSTABILITY 
The more interesting task, however, is to trace out the circuit of money 
capital M-M’. We take it that the money initially advanced by the capitalists at the 
beginning of t, Mt, buys the initial inputs (a11 + a21)Y1t for Department I, and the 
initial inputs (a12 + a22)Y2t for Department II. At the end of the M-M’ circuit, all 
the output is sold at the new price and the difference between M’ and M is profits 
or m as Marx labels it or, 
M’t+1 = Mt + m(t/t+1).     (7) 
The subscript to m is written as it is because it emerges within the production 
period but is realised at the end. Marx solves the realisation problem by using the 
equations for accumulation. This relates to the way in which Mt+1 will enter into 
production again. But since the realisation has to be before the re-advancing of the 
realised capital, Marx’s solution is questioned by Luxemburg. However, we can 
investigate this issue in the more general framework posited by Morishima.  
First, let pt+1 denote the 1 × 2 vector of prices prevailing at the end of t – 
beginning of t + 1. By pre-multiplying (4) by pt+1, we obtain 
pt+1 Yt = pt+1AYt + pt+1 A∆Yt + pt+1BYt.   (8) 
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Equation (8) looks simple but contains a lot of information. The term pt+1Yt 
on the left hand side is output at the end of t - beginning of t + 1, valued at prices 
which will prevail in t + 1. On the right hand side, first, we have expenditure to 
replace inputs consumed during production, pt+1AYt. Then, is the buying of the 
inputs for next period’s production which is the term pt+1A∆Yt. Since the inputs 
are used in the next period they are priced at next period’s prices. The last item is 
the consumption expenditure of the capitalists which is also bought at the end of 
period at the new prices. 
Indeed, equation (8) shows the theoretical and analytical differences with the 
literature on dual instability, which arise from the class perspective incorporated 
in the system. In Solow (1959) and Jorgenson (1960A, 1960B), there is no class 
dimension, and thus the consumption of all agents is equally treated as part of the 
reproducibility requirements of the system, and is incorporated into the Leontieff 
matrix A. Here, we distinguish between worker and capitalist consumption, 
whereby the former is included in A and is advanced by the capitalists, whereas 
the latter is included in B and is paid out of revenues. 
Absent a theory of prices, however, there is not much else we can say about 
the M-M’ circuit. Hence, we shall add some more structure to Morishima’s (1973) 
model. We assume that at the beginning of each period, capitalists can decide 
either to enter production buying all necessary inputs (including wage goods) 
using their wealth (which is thus transformed into productive capital). 
Alternatively, they can lend their wealth on the financial market and receive the 
competitive interest rate, thus becoming financial capitalists. Let rt denote the 
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competitive interest rate at t. If they choose to produce one unit of good i, 
capitalists need to advance an amount of money equal to pt A.i and receive a price 
equal to pit+1 at the end of the production process. By investing the same amount 
of money in the financial market, they earn a gross return of (1 + rt) pt A.i. Hence, 
assuming that competitive conditions prevail, both investments must yield the 
same return and the no arbitrage conditions can be written as follows.4 
pt+1 = (1 + rt) ptA.    (9) 
Equation (9) describes the dynamic path of prices in a rather convenient 
form and it allows us to exploit the results of the literature on dual instability, 
conveniently modified to fit our specific framework. In fact, Morishima’s analysis 
of R can be applied noting that if B is equal to the null matrix then R = A, and that 
nothing in Morishima’s analysis depends on I - B ≠ I: assuming that department I 
is more capital intensive, A has two positive roots smaller than one. Hence, 
whereas the quantity system has an unstable balanced growth path, the price 
system has a (asymptotically) stable balanced ‘growth’ path, with prices vanishing 
in the limit, provided the interest rate is equal to zero. 
However, the existence of a positive interest rate enriches the dynamic 
possibilities of this economy. Assume for simplicity that the interest rate is 
constant. (At most, it will fluctuate in the neighbourhood of the constant profit 
rate, which is implied by the linear structure.) Let λ1 and λ2 denote the two latent 
roots of the characteristic equation associated with A; we can write 1 > λ1 > λ2 > 
0.5 The solution to (9) will be as follows. 
p1t = χ1 n11 (1 + r)t (λ1)t + χ2 n21 (1 + r)t (λ2)t,  (10) 
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p2t = χ1 n12 (1 + r)t (λ1)t + χ2 n22 (1 + r)t (λ2)t,  (11) 
where χ1 and χ2 are constants determined by initial prices p0 = (p10, p20), and the 
ns are obtained from the two sets of equations 
(a11 - λi) ni1 + a12 ni2 = 0,    (12a) 
a21 ni1 + (a22 - λi) ni2 = 0.    (12b) 
From (10)-(12), we can derive our main result concerning price dynamics. 
THEOREM 1. (Dual Instability) In the SER economy with competitive pricing and 
a positive, constant interest rate r: 
(i) If 1/(1 + r) ≥ λ1 and initial prices do not correspond to the stationary 
values, then prices tend to the latter. Depending on initial conditions, 
decrease can take place along a balanced or an unbalanced path, but the 
balanced path is stable.  
(ii) If 1/(1 + r) > λ1, then the only stationary prices are equal to zero, whereas 
if 1/(1 + r) = λ1 then there exists a strictly positive vector of stationary 
prices. 
Proof. Part (i). First, convergence follows from (10) and (11) noting that 1 > λ1 > 
λ2. Second, initial conditions determine the value of χ1 and χ2 and thus 
whether prices will move at the same rate; but given that λi(1 + r) ≤ 1, i = 1, 
2, then if prices are not on a balanced path, they will converge to it.  
Part (ii). Finally, if (1 + r) = 1/λ1, then by the Perron-Frobenius theorem 
there is a strictly positive vector of constant prices pF satisfying (9). If (1 + r) 
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< 1/λ1 - and thus (1 + r) < 1/λ2 - then the only constant vector prices 
satisfying (9) is the zero vector. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 1 describes the form in which dual instability manifests itself in the 
Marxian SER schema, if one assumes competitive dynamic pricing. But we can 
also give an economic interpretation. Given the linear structure of the system, the 
reciprocal of λ1 is (one plus) the profit rate of the system. Thus if λ1 > 1/(1 + r), 
i.e. rate of interest exceeds the profit rate, dual instability would be present: 
although the price system, too, would have at least one unstable root the balanced 
growth path would be asymptotically stable. Yet, arguably, this is the 
economically uninteresting case because the gross interest rate would persistently 
exceed the profitability of the system. The results above concern the case where 
either the profit rate exceeds the gross interest rate or they are just equal. 
Although the dynamic behaviour of prices is interesting, our aim is to 
characterise the behaviour of money aggregates, that is, the circuit of money 
capital. Let ωt denote the 2 × 1 vector of aggregate endowments of both goods in 
the economy at the beginning of t. Since workers do not save, all assets in the 
economy are owned by capitalists. Hence, the money capital circuit will start off 
with Mt = ptωt. Assuming full employment of capital, under (9) it will be true that 
Mt = ptωt = ptAYt, all t. Furthermore, if ωt+1 denotes physical assets accumulated 
up to t + 1, and available for production, in the circuit of money capital we have 
Mt+1 = pt+1ωt+1. In order to derive a precise expression describing the dynamics of 
M, note that (8) is equivalent to  
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pt+1 Yt = pt+1AYt+1 + pt+1BYt,   (8') 
where the first term on the right hand side is just the monetary value of assets at 
the beginning of t + 1, that is, pt+1AYt+1 = pt+1ωt+1. Hence, in terms of Marx’s 
description of the money capital circuit, we have Mt = ptAYt, M’t+1 = pt+1Yt, and 
Mt+1 = pt+1AYt+1. Therefore, by (7) and (8') we can derive the following equation. 
M’t+1 = Mt + m(t/t+1) = Mt+1 + pt+1BYt.   (7') 
From (7'), it follows that M’t+1 ≥ Mt as long as profits are nonnegative and 
Mt+1 ≥ Mt as long as the monetary value of consumption is not higher than money 
profits. However, in order to characterise the dynamics of money capital more 
precisely, we need a more explicit expression in terms of Mt and Mt+1, which is 
actually given by (8') and (9), using the fact that Mt = ptωt = ptAyt, all t. 
pt+1ωt+1 = (1 + r) ptωt - (1 + r) pt ABYt.   (13) 
THEOREM 2. (The M-M’ circuit.) In the SER economy with competitive pricing 
and a constant, positive interest rate r such that 1/(1 + r) ≥ λ1, there is a positive 
number b* such that money capital grows without bounds for all b∈ [0, b*) along 
the BGP. 
Proof. 1. If capitalists do not consume, then b = 0 and B = 0, where 0 is a matrix 
with all zeros and by (7') M’t+1 = Mt+1, all t. The result follows by noting that 
money capital then moves according to the following expression. 
pt+1ωt+1 = (1 + r) ptωt.    (13') 
2. Consider now the case with b > 0 and B ≠ 0. By (8') and using the 
competitive pricing equation (9), we write 
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Mt+1 = pt+1AYt+1 = (1 + r)ptAYt – (1 + r)ptABYt,  (14) 
which describes the dynamics of Mt. Factoring terms out and using (9), the 
latter expression can be written as 
Mt+1 = (1 + r)t+1p0At+1[I –B]Yt,     
or, using the diagonalisation A = VΛV-1, 
Mt+1 = (1 + r)t+1p0 V Λt+1V-1 [I –B]Yt.  (14') 
Next, recall that Morishima’s (1973) matrix R is defined as R = [I –B]-1A so 
that Yt = [R-1]tY0, or using the diagonalisation R-1 = E Z E-1,  
Yt = E Zt E-1Y0,     (15) 
where Z is the inverse of the diagonal matrix of the eigenvalues of R. Thus 
Mt+1 = (1 + r)t+1p0 V Λt+1V-1AE Zt+1 E-1Y0.  (14'') 
If b = 0, then (14'') reduces to Mt+1 = (1 + r)t+1p0 AY0, as in part 1. If b > 0 
consider the BGP of Morishima (1973). First, note that the BGP rate, 1 + g, 
is equal to the inverse of the Frobenius-Perron eigenvalue of R, µ1; that is, (1 
+ g) = (µ1)-1. At the BGP, then (14'') can be written as: 
Mt+1 = (1 + r)t+1p0 V Λt+1V-1A(µ1)-t+1Y0.  (14'') 
Second, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, µ1 is a strictly increasing, 
continuous function of the entries of R. Hence, since R21 and R22 are strictly 
increasing in b, a fortiori µ1 is a strictly increasing, continuous function of b 
such that µ1 = λ1 if b = 0 and µ1 = 1 if b = 1. Finally, note that 1 ≥ λ1(1 + r) > 
λ2(1 + r) and let b* be the value of b such that λ1(1 + r) = µ1. Then we can 
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conclude that for all b ∈ [0, b*) money capital grows without bounds. 
Q.E.D. 
Remarks. The assumption that 1/(1 + r) ≥ λ1 plays no role if b = 0: if 
capitalists do not consume, then a positive interest rate is sufficient for 
money capital to increase exponentially. Another way to put this is that a 
profit rate above the rate of interest allows some room for capitalists’ 
consumption without necessarily affecting accumulation. But if capitalists 
consumption is zero , then accumulation is better secured. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
We have re-examined Marx’s SER which was subjected to an immanent 
critique by Rosa Luxemburg. However along with her contemporary Marxist 
critics she took Marx’s investment rule as given. The difficulty with this rule is 
that it is arbitrary and variable enough to ensure superstability but as a piece of 
legerdemain. We extend Morishima’s more systematic analysis to embrace prices 
and money circuit of capital. We find a relationship between the rate of interest 
and the rate of profit and explore the limits to capitalist consumption as it affects 
accumulation. There are still issues which remain. Thus, ideally we require an ex-
ante investment rule to see if that will lead to cycles and crises. We hope to take 
up such issues in future work. 
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1
 On Fel’dman’s model see Desai (1979, chapter 17). 
2
 This notation is adapted from Desai (1979, chapter 5). 
3
 It is interesting to note that this was the stability condition in Uzawa’s paper on two sector 
growth models which revived interest in this literature (Uzawa, 1961). 
4
 Equation (9) is derived under the implicit assumption of no fixed capital. 
5
 This can also be derived from the Perron-Frobenius theorem given that A is a nonnegative, 
productive, indecomposable matrix. 
